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Recent discussions in Australia have suggested that Pacific
island countries should ‘dollarise’ to the Australian dollar.
This is seen as a way to stabilise the economies of the
region, which have been fraught with political and
economic uncertainty. Standard currency analysis
techniques indicate that dollarisation to the US dollar may
be preferable. With Asia likely to overtake Australia as a
dominant trading partner of major Pacific island
economies, a discussion of currency reform in the Pacific
should at least consider US dollarisation.
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Chakriya Bowman
No economist would disagree that an
economy is affected by the decisions of its
government and that political instability is
rarely associated with a sound economy. The
past decade has been marked by political
instability in Pacific island countries
(especially in Fiji, Solomon Islands and
Papua New Guinea) and a lack of economic
development (especially in Papua New
Guinea, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu). As
Duncan and Chand (2002) point out, ‘all
Pacific island countries…are experiencing
difficulties in generating better living
standards for their peoples and the political
instability is making economic development
even more difficult’ (2002:1). Duncan and
Chand cite a number of factors that contribute
to economic instability in the Pacific island
countries, prime among them being high
youth unemployment and low literacy rates.
The Commonwealth of Australia recently
offered dollarisation as a panacea for the
economic ills of the Pacific (Australia 2003),
an idea which has been speculated upon by
both academics (Duncan 2002, de Brouwer
2000) and journalists alike (‘Towards a
Pacific common market’, The Sydney Morning
Herald, 14 August 2003). The Howard
government is encouraging Pacific island
countries to form unions and to amalgamate
resources in an attempt to jump-start
economic growth.
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There has been much discussion over the
past decade about the suitability of various
currency regimes in emerging markets.
Modern wisdom in the field of currency
regimes for less developed countries seems
to be trending toward one of two extremes:
either countries should maintain an
independently floating currency, such as that
of the US dollar, or use a hard peg to fix the
exchange rate to that of an important trading
partner with a freely floating currency, such
as the US dollar (Berg, Borensztein and
Mauro 2002). Dollarisation, the process of
adopting a major currency (usually the US
dollar) as the currency of a smaller state, has
been proposed for a variety of emerging
market countries such as those of Latin
America (Berg, Borensztein and Mauro
2002), Eastern Europe (Rusek 2002), and even
Canada (Berg and Borensztein 2000). Indeed,
some economists believe that all emerging
markets should dollarise as a remedy for
currency and economic instability (Calvo
and Reinhart 1999).
The dollarisation proposed for the Pacific
island countries is the adoption of the
Australian dollar (Australia 2003). This
proposal is seen as a remedy for the region’s
ongoing economic malaise, and the notion
is popular in Australian political and
academic circles. However, the idea of
‘aussification’ is somewhat less popular
with the Pacific island countries themselves;
the suggestion having been received by
island leaders with somewhat less
enthusiasm than it was proposed by
Australian Prime Minister John Howard.1
The political import of the issue should not
be underestimated, however.
This paper seeks to contribute to the
debate using recent currency data to
determine whether the proposal for
‘aussification’ has merit. Prior studies have
taken the assumption of strong Australian
dollar ties as fact. However, using standard
currency analysis techniques, this study
finds little evidence to support the belief that
the Australian dollar is the most influential
currency in the Pacific region. There is little
evidence to support a strong and influential
relationship between the floating Papua New
Guinea kina and the Australian dollar, and
regression testing indicates that only Tonga
contains the Australian dollar in its currency
basket. Cointegration testing offers a little
more support for long-run relationships
between the Pacific island currencies and the
Australian dollar, but equally it supports
relationships with the US dollar and the New
Zealand dollar. Further, trading relationships
have changed markedly over the past decade.
The emergence of Asia as a major trading
partner to many industrial economies during
the 1990s has been echoed in the Pacific
islands and, if recent trends continue, the US
dollar value of trade with Asia will soon
exceed that with Australia. With the kina the
only floating Pacific currency, it is significant
that the kina appears to be so strongly related
to the US dollar, and it is possible that the
strength of trade with Asia may lie behind
this. If trade with Asia is denominated in US
dollars, as is likely to be the case, then it is
possible that dollarisation in its true sense is
preferable to ‘aussification’. Further
investigation of the macroeconomic trading
relationships between the Pacific and Asia
is warranted, particularly since the economic
changes made during the 1997 East Asian
crisis, but will be left for other research.
As the United States is a less actively
involved political force in the region, a
decision to adopt the US dollar might prove
to be far more beneficial to the Pacific island
countries than the decision to adopt the
Australian dollar. However, this paper does
not propose that the US dollar should be
adopted for the Pacific. Rather, it seeks to
highlight the fact that alternative proposals
may be worthy of study, particularly those of
currency unions. It aims to provoke further
debate before ‘aussification’ is accepted as
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the appropriate way forward (Australia
2003, Recommendation 1:xiii).
Issues affecting the Pacific island
countries
The Pacific island countries being
considered for membership of the proposed
Pacific Union consist of the Cook Islands,
Fiji, Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati,
Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Caledonia,
Niue, the Northern Mariana Islands, Papua
New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands,
Tonga, Tokelau, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. Of
these 16 countries only six have their own
currency (Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Samoa,
Solomon Islands, Tonga and Vanuatu). The
Tongan pa’anga was pegged to the
Australian dollar during the 1980s, but was
subsequently pegged to a basket of currencies
in 1991.2 Vanuatu has likewise used a
currency basket, composed using a
transaction-weighted technique. Solomon
Islands and Fiji use fixed-peg exchange rates,
while the Papua New Guinea kina has been
a floating currency since 1994—which
perhaps accounts for its high variance (Table
1). It should be noted, however, that there is
evidence of government intervention in the
kina (Duncan and Xu 2000), and it is perhaps
best regarded as a managed float. The other
Pacific island countries share a currency with
a more developed nation (Cook Islands,
Niue and Tokelau use the New Zealand
dollar; Kiribati, Tuvalu and Nauru use the
Australian dollar; Federated States of
Micronesia, Northern Mariana Islands and
Marshall Islands use the US dollar; and New
Caledonia uses the French Pacific franc).
The Pacific island countries share many
economic conditions in common: they are
micro economies, reliant on commodity
exports and tourism for revenue; their
economies are affected significantly by
commodity export revenue variability (In
and Onchoke 1995); and they have been
subject to much political instability and civil
unrest (Duncan and Chand 2002). Pacific
island countries were mostly colonies for
much of the past two centuries before
achieving independence relatively recently.
They have extremely underdeveloped
economies and are substantial consumers of
foreign aid. Australia is the second-largest
aid donor to the Pacific island countries,
with Japan the largest donor, and New
Zealand the third largest (Australia 2003).
As a result, Australia and New Zealand take
a somewhat proprietary view of the region,
and Australia has recently been regarded as
the neighbourhood ‘sheriff’ by the United
States (‘We want to take off the sheriff’s
badge’, The Canberra Times, 27 October 2003),
although it is debatable whether Australians,
much less Pacific island inhabitants, are
comfortable with this concept.
A range of currency regimes has been
considered for the Pacific island countries,
and indeed the Papua New Guinea kina was
floated in 1993 with encouragement from
Australia (Karunaratne 1988, Australia
1995). At this time a floating exchange rate
was generally regarded by economists as the
most beneficial currency regime for a
developing economy, but the aftermath of the
Asian crisis of 1997 has seen a reassessment
of this opinion (see Frankel et al. 2001 for a
summary of the discussion with respect to
emerging markets). Studies by the
International Monetary Fund and other
prominent economic bodies have reassessed
options such as currency boards, fixed pegs
and dollarisation for stabilising small and
emerging market economies without leaving
them exposed to sharp fluctuations in their
currencies, which may damage their levels
of trade. When discussing the problems of
the Pacific islands, dollarisation to the
Australian dollar is the most common
proposal and indeed it is the only option
considered in many papers. An alternative
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is the formation of a currency union, modeled
perhaps on that of the Caribbean. Jayaraman
(2003) examines this proposal but finds that
a number of the preconditions for such a
union, including levels of intra-country
trade, correlations in export prices and factor
mobility, are not satisfied and concludes that
dollarisation remains the most viable option.
In an attempt to find solutions to the
economic dysfunction of the Pacific island
countries, the Australian Government
(Australia 2003), taking its lead from
scholarly debate, proposed that a single
economic and political community could be
established, with the Australian dollar
becoming the regional currency. There will
be much political discussion, both within
Australia and within the Pacific island
countries, as to whether this is appropriate.
This study addresses some of the empirical
support for the Australian dollarisation of
the Pacific. The political ramifications of
such a decision are left for other studies.
Dollarisation
Dollarisation is the process whereby a
country forgoes its own currency and adopts
that of another country. The seeming success
of the European Union and its single
currency and the US dollar as the unofficial
currency of many developing economies has
encouraged the debate as to whether
dollarisation is a suitable solution for the
problem of developing economy instability.
During the 1990s many developing
economies were urged by the International
Monetary Fund to float their exchange rates
in an attempt to enhance economic
development. However, the position of the
Fund has changed—partly as a result of the
1997 East Asia currency crisis—and in the
early part of the new century the prescription
for exchange rate regimes is less clear cut.
Mechanisms such as currency boards, pegs
and dollarisation are back on the agenda and
are being broadly debated in the circles of
development economics.
The arguments in favour of dollarisation
in developing economies are outlined
succinctly by Berg and Borensztein (2000).
Pegs and currency boards can become targets
for currency traders and this is particularly
problematic for small, fragile economies. By
dollarising to a large, liquid currency, the
chances of falling victim to a speculative
attack are significantly diminished. Likewise,
it is less likely that major investors will
suddenly withdraw capital if there is no fear
of a sudden or sharp devaluation. This
argument suggests that the currencies of the
island nations of the Pacific would be less
prone to speculative attacks and, more
importantly, a significantly more attractive
destination for foreign investment than has
previously been the case if they were to use
the Australian dollar as the official currency.
Duncan (2002) proposes Australian
dollarisation of the Pacific island nations as
a method to reduce government costs,
stabilise monetary policy (indeed, remove the
monetary policy responsibility from the
island nations), and fix interest and inflation
rates to those of Australia. Additionally, as
dollarisation may eliminate the potential for
sharp revaluations in the currency—at least
with respect to the currency it is dollarising
against—the increased currency stability will
promote increased trade between the
economies. Arguments in favour of
dollarisation to the Australian dollar are
based primarily on the fact that, in the past,
Australia has been the major trading partner
of the Pacific island countries (de Brouwer
2000).
For better or for worse, Australian
dollarisation would tie the countries of the
Pacific to Australia, and once the process
commenced, it would be extremely difficult
to reverse. Berg and Borensztein (2000)
observe that the few cases of a reversal of
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dollarisation are in newly independent
countries, such as those of the former Soviet
Union, previously dollarised to inconvertible
currencies. Alternatives, such as currency
boards, may be changed as conditions merit.
In most discussions of Pacific dollarisation
there has been a direct leap from the idea of
dollarisation to the implementation of the
Australian dollar as the primary currency,
rather than the US dollar, the Japanese yen,
the New Zealand dollar, or even the French
franc, all of which may have equal claims.
Several countries already use the Australian
dollar but several also use the New Zealand
dollar and the US dollar, and Japan is the
largest aid donor in the region.
A significant argument made in favour
of dollarisation in the Pacific is that it would
result in interest rate stability. Duncan (2002)
argues that interest rates would be ‘largely
determined in Australia’ (Duncan 2002:145),
and hence would offer some monetary policy
stability to the Pacific island countries.
However, it is unlikely that interest rates
would be similar to those of Australia. Any
issue of government debt would attract a risk
premium due to the significantly greater risk
of default, effectively increasing interest rates
at a country level. While, as noted,
dollarisation may remove the ability of
various governments to print currency as a
way of managing deficits, it does not mean
that the dollarising nation immediately
inherits the stability of the country to whose
currency it is dollarising. Certainly, the
issuance of bonds and their efficient servicing
is a preferable way to manage government
debt, but should a government choose to
default on the bonds, the results are in every
way as disastrous as the money-printing
remedy. A cessation of capital inflow at that
point is not improved simply because the
capital is (not) in Australian dollars. Berg
and Borensztein (2000) point out that the
issue of dollar-denominated debt is
effectively the same as dollarising and then
issuing government debt, as in each case the
debt has eliminated exchange rate risk.
Issuing US or Australian dollar-denominated
debt would be a far simpler exercise for a
Pacific island government than going to the
extreme of dollarising the entire financial
system.
Further, when Berg and Borensztein
examine the borrowing practices of
Argentina, which has both peso and US
dollar-denominated debt, they observe that
while a spread between the two types of debt
exists, the interest rate of the US dollar-
denominated debt is still significantly higher
than that of developed countries, reflecting
the default risk inherent in the bonds. While
dollarisation may make borrowing a little
cheaper for the Pacific nations, it will still
come at a price higher than that which would
be charged to Australia. It would also be
difficult for many Pacific island nations to
find buyers for their bonds: government fiscal
management has not been a strength of these
countries, and their ability to repay loans is
questionable.
Seigniorage is also lost when a country
dollarises. While this may not account for a
great deal of revenue, its loss may be felt
keenly by a small economy. Proposals for
dollarisation often include a sharing
arrangement for seigniorage and it is
anticipated that the Pacific island nations
would pursue such opportunities before
agreeing to adopt any form of dollarisation.
It is possible that smaller countries such as
Australia or New Zealand would be willing
to share seigniorage with the Pacific
countries; it is less likely that the United States
would be prepared to do so.
An alternative to dollarisation is the
formation of a currency union. A currency
union has the benefit of allowing the Pacific
countries unity, while preserving their
independence from former colonial powers.
As such, it may be a more palatable option to
Pacific leaders. Such a union would see
PACIFIC ISLAND COUNTRIES AND DOLLARISATION
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individual members give up their individual
currencies and join a centrally administered
organisation much like that of the European
Union. Berg, Borensztein and Mauro (2002)
observe that a benefit of a currency union is
improved central bank independence and
the promotion of monetary and fiscal
discipline. They also point out that a
common currency will promote intra-
regional trade. Seignorage is retained and a
sharing arrangement could be negotiated
between countries joining the union. Another
benefit is that the currency union may
promote good governance practices
throughout the region. Indeed, by promoting
a common currency it is more likely that there
will be subsequent improvements in central
bank and governmental accountability as the
Pacific island countries will be required to
maintain credibility. The adoption of a
foreign currency would eliminate this
necessity; less accountability is not ideal for
this region.
Finally, recent work by Huang and Wei
(2003) finds that monetary regimes such as
currency boards and dollarisation are likely
to fail in countries with high levels of
corruption. They find that a ‘conservative
central banker’ is preferable to exchange rate-
driven monetary regimes under corruption,
and question the ability of low inflation
targets and currency boards to motivate
ethical behaviour in governments.
Empirical support for dollarisation
While much discussion has taken place
about the macroeconomic support for
dollarisation, little time-series analysis has
been performed. It is of interest, therefore, to
determine whether there is any empirical
support for the idea that the Australian
dollar is a related currency to the currencies
of the Pacific island countries. It is to be
expected that if there are significant trading
relationships and other economic ties
between Australia and the Pacific island
countries, this will be reflected in their
currency relationships. Studies of currency
relationships generally fall into two
categories: those using regression analysis,
as per Frankel and Wei (1994); and those
using cointegration analysis as per
Aggarwal and Mougouè (1996). This study
uses both methods, as per Bowman (2004a,
2004b).
Before using regression analysis, tests for
stationarity should be made. Three unit root
tests are used in this study: the Augmented
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test (Dickey and Fuller
1981), the Phillips and Perron (PP) test (1988)
and the Zivot and Andrews (1994) test for
unit roots in the presence of structural breaks.
The first two tests, both of which test the null
hypothesis of a unit root, are widely used in
the currency literature (for example, Baillie
and Bollerslev 1989, Bowman 2004b).
However, the existence of breakpoints in the
data, often caused by regime changes, may
result in misspecification if tests do not
incorporate adjustments for structural
breaks. The Zivot and Andrews test can be
used to determine stationarity in the presence
of a structural break. The Zivot and Andrews
test has the added advantage of dynamically
determining the location of a breakpoint—it
does not require visual identification of the
break and hence is not susceptible to
arbitrary period selection.
The results of these tests (Table 2)
indicate that unit roots are present in most
series. The ADF and PP tests fail to reject the
null hypothesis of a unit root for any of the
currencies examined, although the results
differ slightly when the Zivot and Andrews
test is used. Breakpoints are identified in the
Papua New Guinea kina, the Solomon
Island dollar, and the British pound, and the
null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected in
each case. If these currencies do in fact
contain breakpoints, then ADF and PP
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results are likely to be misleading as they do
not adjust for structural changes in the data,
and therefore the null hypothesis of a unit
root can be rejected for these currencies.
Having confirmed that most currencies
examined here are likely to be characterised
as unit root processes, an initial investigation
into currency relationships was made using
a standard OLS regression as per Frankel and
Wei (1994), modeled such that
tGBPJPYNZD
AUDUSDC
SSS
SSS
HEEE
EED
'''
'' '
lnlnln
lnlnln
543
21
(1)
where SC represents the Pacific island country
currency, SUSD represents the US dollar, SAUD
represents the Australian dollar, SNZD
represents the New Zealand dollar, and SGBP
represents the British pound, with daily
currency data denominated in Swiss franc.
The results of this regression are shown
in Table 3, with statistically significant
results highlighted in bold. The evidence for
the use of the Australian dollar in the Pacific
is not compelling. Of the five Pacific island
currencies, only the Papua New Guinea kina
is a ‘floating’ currency, and it is the kina
which shows the least support for a
relationship with the Australian dollar.
Indeed, the kina is highly related to the US
dollar (93 per cent) and hence the traditional
notion of dollarisation seems to be the most
appropriate, if existing currency behaviour
is retained. While there remains the
likelihood of significant central bank
intervention, the kina nonetheless seems to
be most affected by movements in the US
dollar, and the weighting for the Australian
dollar is irrelevant.
The currencies of Fiji and Vanuatu
likewise feature the US dollar most
significantly in their basket of currencies.
Vanuatu and Fiji both have currency pegs, and
the implication of the regression seen here is
that they peg primarily, if not entirely, to the
US dollar. The high R2 values indicate that
the equations are reasonably well specified:
there is nothing here to suggest that the
Australian dollar has a significant weighting
in the respective currency baskets, and hence
the decision to change to the Australian dollar
would need to be supported by significant
economic fundamentals, as this implies that
a transition to the Australian dollar would
not be economically straightforward. Only the
Tongan pa’anga seems to feature the
Australian dollar significantly in its currency
basket—with the Australian dollar
comprising around two-thirds of the basket,
while the British pound constitutes the
remainder. The Solomon Island dollar also
appears to be weighted around 55 per cent
toward the British pound, with the US dollar
making up the remainder. It would not appear
that the pegs implemented by the Solomon
Islands, Fiji or Vanuatu feature the Australian
dollar.
Robustness checks can be made using
cointegration testing. The Johansen test for
cointegration (Johansen and Juselius 1990)
is again commonly used in the currency
literature (Aggarwal and Mougouè 1996,
Zhou 1998) to test for long-run relationships
between currencies. However, if not modified
to adjust for structural breaks, it may also
misspecify relationships. The Gregory and
Hansen (1996) test for cointegration adjusts
for structural breaks, again dynamically
determining the location of the breakpoint to
avoid arbitrary period selection.
Johansen cointegration testing (Table 4)
indicates that significant long-run
relationships exist where not immediately
identified by regression testing. Fiji is found
to have significant long-run relationships
with Australia, New Zealand, and the
United Kingdom, as well as with the US
dollar (as identified in regression testing).
Likewise, there is evidence of long-run
relationships between Tonga and both
Australia and New Zealand, and between
Vanuatu and Australia, New Zealand and
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Table 3 Basic regression relationships, 1993–2003
β 1 US$ β2 A$ β3 NZ$ β4 JPY β5 GBP R2 DW
(t-statistic) (t-statistic) (t-statistic)(t-statistic) (t-statistic)
Fiji (dollar) 0.9611 0.0207 –0.02 0.02 0.0080 0.69 2.25
15.37 0.67 –0.61 0.79 0.23
Papua New Guinea (kina) 0.9293 –0.0314 0.03 0.04 –0.0002 0.35 1.93
11.24 –0.75 0.69 1.38 –0.01
Solomon Islands (dollar) 0.4654 0.0258 0.00 0.01 0.5382 0.58 2.17
6.99 0.77 –0.14 0.34 15.05
Tonga (pa’anga) –0.2438 0.6936 0.02 0.03 0.4485 0.80 2.70
–5.66 32.06 1.11 2.11 19.36
Vanuatu (vatu) 0.9520 0.0102 0.01 0.01 0.0178 0.83 2.08
34.23 0.73 0.41 0.73 1.17
Note: All currencies denominated in Swiss francs. The basic regression of Equation 1 provides little support
for the Australian dollar as a choice of currency. The greatest level of support is for the US dollar, with most
currencies strongly linked. There is also more support for the British pound, which is significantly related to
both the Tongan pa’anga and the Solomon Island dollar. Despite the levels of trade between Australia and
the Pacific island nations, the only currency with support for the Australian dollar is the Tongan pa’anga.
The Japanese yen is not linked with any of the currencies during this period.
the United States. However, cointegration
testing indicates only the presence of
relationships; it does not indicate the strength
of the relationships or define a weighting, as
the Frankel and Wei regression analysis does.
While the Johansen test does not indicate
the presence of cointegration for the Papua
New Guinea kina or the Solomon Islands
dollar, this may be because the currencies
contain breakpoints (as identified by the
Zivot and Andrews test), and so the results
of the Gregory and Hansen test (Table 5) better
specify relationships for these currencies.
Indeed, the Gregory and Hansen test finds
evidence of cointegration only for these
currencies, and only the Solomon Islands/
Australia and Solomon Islands/New
Zealand relationships are significant to 10
per cent. It is interesting that no long-run
evidence is found to confirm the results of
regression testing, which indicated strong US
dollar relationships in each case. Again, the
presence of stationarity and structural breaks
may be misspecifying the relationship here.
Overall, from both regression and
cointegration testing, there is mixed evidence
as to whether the Australian dollar is
significantly related to the currencies of the
Pacific island countries. Regression analysis
indicates that at least four of these currencies,
including the floating Papua New Guinean
kina, would be more suited to US
dollarisation. These results imply a
significant level of unofficial dollarisation
already exits. Cointegration testing, while
offering a little more support for long-run
relationships with the Australian dollar,
finds equivalent support for the US dollar. It
should be noted that cointegration testing
does not offer a ranking of importance, merely
an indication of the existence of
cointegration.
Correlations between the five Pacific
island currencies shed light on currency
dynamics within the region (Table 6). The
currencies of Papua New Guinea and the
Solomon Islands are highly correlated with
each other but not with the remaining
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countries, while the currencies of Vanuatu,
Fiji and Tonga are all highly correlated. These
are interesting results, considering that the
kina is a floating currency while the Solomon
Island dollar is a managed peg, and appears
to be weighted to the US dollar and the British
pound. Economic relationships may help to
explain this: Tonga, Fiji and Vanuatu have
significant trading relationships with each
other, with Tonga and Vanuatu being
dependent on exports from Fiji; while
Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea
also trade between each other to a significant
degree (International Monetary Fund 2004).
The most interesting change in Pacific
import and export composition over the past
ten years has been the increasing relevance
of Asia, both for imports and as an export
destination. Conventional wisdom states
that Australia is a significant trading partner
for the Pacific island countries, and for this
reason the Australian dollar is the most
appropriate currency for dollarisation (de
Brouwer 2000, Duncan 2002). While
Australia remains the largest exporter to the
Pacific island countries in US dollar terms,
there has been little change in the level of
trade from the beginning to the end of the
decade (Figure 1). A large spike in exports
during the mid 1990s proved to be temporary.
This is not the case for trade with Asia.
Exports have risen considerably over the
decade, and if past trends continue, Asian
exports will eclipse those from Australia in
the not-too-distant future. This change is
perhaps behind the dominance of the US
dollar in the Pacific island currencies; if Asian
countries are denominating their goods in US
dollars, as is likely, it may be that this increase
in trade is responsible for the decisions to peg
to the US dollar. Support for the use of the US
dollar in these circumstances may be found
in prior currency studies of Asia such as
Bowman (2004a), which uses Frankel and Wei
(1994) regression analysis to show that the
currencies of East Asia remain highly related
to the US dollar, despite the regime changes
seen in the aftermath of the 1997 East Asian
crisis.
Overall, exports from Asia to the Pacific
island countries (Table 7) have increased
over the past decade, while exports from
Table 4 Johansen cointegration test
Papua New Guinea Fiji Solomon Islands Tonga Vanuatu
Australia - 36.06** a - 454.83** a 17.47* b
New Zealand - 34.42** a - 16.18* a 17.35* b
Japan - - - - -
United Kingdom - 29.36* a - - -
United States - 32.24** a - - 15.56* b
Note: ** Significant to 1 per cent
* Significant to 5 per cent
a Intercept and trend
b Intercept, no trend
Johansen cointegration testing found no cointegrating relationship between the developed economy currencies
and those of Papua New Guinea or the Solomon Islands. Fiji’s currency basket showed long-run cointegrating
relationships with Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States. Tonga demonstrated
long-run cointegrating relationships with the Australian dollar, which was observed from regression testing,
and weaker evidence for the New Zealand dollar, which was not. Vanuatu was cointegrated with Australia,
New Zealand and the United States at 5 per cent. Lags typically numbered 1–4.
126
PACIFIC ECONOMIC BULLETIN
Pacific Economic Bulletin Volume 19 Number 3 2004 © Asia Pacific Press
Table 5 Gregory and Hansen cointegration test
Papua New Guinea Solomon Islands
t Date t Date
Australia n.a. n.a –4.743356^ 24/04/2002
New Zealand –3.690134 19/06/2001 –4.962797^ 1/05/2002
Japan –4.143921 16/06/1999 –3.987882 8/03/1995
United Kingdom –3.078221 19/06/2001 –3.716524 31/01/1995
United States –3.270766 11/06/1999 –4.290791 5/04/2002
Note: * Significant to 5 per cent
^ Significant to 10 per cent
No evidence of cointegration was found for Tonga, Vanuatu or Papua New Guinea/Australia using the
Gregory and Hansen test, confirming the results of the Zivot and Andrews test, which indicates breakpoints
only in the currencies of Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands. Evidence at significant levels was
found only for Solomon Islands/Australia and Solomon Islands/New Zealand. Critical values determined
by Gregory and Hansen (1996) are –5.45 (1 per cent), –5.21 (1.5 per cent), –4.99 (5 per cent) and –4.72 (10
per cent).
Figure 1 Value of imports to Pacific island countries, 1993–2002 (US$ million)
Note: Import demand from Asia (excluding Japan) is growing after a slight decline around the time of the
East Asian crisis (late 1997) and is continuing in an upward trend, while imports from Australia have
decreased. The spike in Australian imports during the mid 1990s was primarily due to an increase in
demand from Papua New Guinea, and may reflect imports of mining equipment. Imports from Japan have
halved over the decade.
Source: International Monetary Fund, various issues. International Financial Statistics, International Monetary
Fund, Washington, DC.
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Table 6 Pacific island currency correlations, 1993–2003
Fiji Papua New Guinea Solomon Island Tonga Vanuatu
(dollar) (kina) (dollar) (pa’anga) (vatu)
Fiji (dollar) 1.0000
Papua New Guinea (kina) 0.3917 1.0000
Solomon Island (dollar) –0.0019 0.8326 1.0000
Tonga (pa’anga) 0.9694 0.5165 0.1763 1.0000
Vanuatu (vatu) 0.9878 0.2930 –0.1139 0.9404 1.0000
Note: The correlations between nominal island currencies provide more evidence of currency relationships
between the island countries than between the islands and the industrial countries. There is a negative
relationship between the Fiji dollar and the Solomon Islands dollar, and between the Solomon Islands and
Vanuatu currencies. The results indicate there may be two systems of relationships here: one containing Fiji,
Tonga and Vanuatu, and the other comprising the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea.
Australia appear to be falling to the Pacific
island countries. Papua New Guinea
remains the only country whose trade with
Australia, in terms of both imports and
exports, is greater than with Asia. All other
countries now export more to Asia than
Australia, and Tonga, Vanuatu and the
Solomon Islands also import more from Asia
than Australia. Only Papua New Guinea and
Fiji continue to send a considerable share of
their exports to Australia (Table 8). In each
case, the importance of Australia as an
export destination has diminished over the
decade. Exports from Papua New Guinea to
Figure 2 Value of exports from Pacific island countries, 1993–2002 (US$ million)
Note: Exports to Asia (ex Japan) have recovered post 1998 and appear to be increasing, while demand
from Japan has deteriorated significantly over the decade.
Source: International Monetary Fund, various issues. International Financial Statistics, International Monetary
Fund, Washington, DC.
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Australia have fallen from around 35 per
cent of total exports to around 24 per cent.
Similarly, Fiji has seen its share of total
exports to Australia fall from around 22 per
cent in 1993 to around 19 per cent in 2002.
Fiji has seen Asia become a greater market
for exports, while the United States, Japan
and Asia are now taking the bulk of Papua
New Guinea’s exports. The evidence to
support Australia’s position as the dominant
economy in the Pacific region is significantly
weaker than that of a decade ago, and this
fact alone is a good reason to reassess calls
for the Australian dollarisation of the Pacific.
Conclusion
With corruption and recurrent political and
economic turmoil being features of the Pacific
island nations, the Australian Government
has raised the prospect of dollarisation to the
Australian dollar as a panacea for the region’s
ills. There has been some academic discussion
about the perceived benefits of dollarisation,
and the weight of argument has been in favour
of the idea. However, analysis of recent
currency behaviour suggests that this may not
be the best solution if significant structural
adjustment is to be avoided. Ideal candidates
for dollarisation are small economies with
close trade and economic links to the
originating country. But evidence suggests
that trade links are changing in the Pacific.
US dollarisation, the de facto standard in Asia,
or a move to a common currency may be
preferable to adopting the Australian dollar.
Further, recent contributions to the less-
developed economy currency regime debate
such as Huang and Wei (2003) indicate that
dollarisation may not be the best regime for
an emerging economy plagued with
corruption.
Of course, there are many reasons why
the Australian Government may find it
beneficial for the region to ‘aussify’, rather
than ‘dollarise’. However, these reasons fall
into the domain of political economy, rather
than empirical economics, and there is
evidence presented here that questions such
enthusiastic support for the adoption of the
Australian dollar. If the trends of the past
decade continue, Asia is likely to become the
dominant trading partner for most Pacific
island countries, and many of the arguments
that favour the use of the Australian dollar
over other currency options may be overtaken
by events.
Notes
1 See for example ‘PM cops it on the nose as
islands refuse to fall into line’, Tom Allard,
The Sydney Morning Herald, 15 August 2003.
2 The International Monetary Fund states that
‘the current exchange arrangement seems to
serve Tonga well’ (International Monetary
Fund 2003:13).
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